Developing Appropriate Environmental Conflict Management Procedures in Indonesia

Developing Appropriate Environmental Conflict Management Procedures in. Indonesia: Integrating Traditional and New Approaches

Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world with a population of over 180 million people, who are members of approximately 300 ethnic groups, and who speak as many as 650 languages. Sixty percent of all Indonesians live on the islands of Java, Madura, and Bali, the other forty percent are unevenly distributed over a geographic area approximately the size of the United States on some 13,000 islands, 6,000 of which are inhabited.

Indonesia is a land rich in resources, and in its course of development has rapidly begun to exploit them. The country has in recent years been at the center of a number of environmental controversies over timber cutting, rattan harvesting, mining operations, water pollution, land encroachments, and oil exploration and production. Parties in these conflicts have included local island populations, indigenous people, transmigrants from other islands, domestic and international companies, non-governmental organizations, and local and national governmental agencies. The impacts of latent, emerging, and manifest environmental problems, and the diversity of institutional and ethnic actors with their diverse traditions of decision-making and dispute resolutions, has prompted a number of Indonesian governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) to explore innovative and culturally appropriate means of resolving environmental disputes. This initiative has sought to integrate traditional values and approaches to decision-making and conflict management with social technologies developed in a number of Asian and western countries. This article outlines these initiatives. Specifically, it examines traditional approaches used by Indonesians to resolve disputes and make decisions which affect larger communities; explores the contemporary context of environmental problems and their resolution; describes several environmental mediation initiatives; identifies cultural and structural factors that influence the use of more cooperative means of dispute resolution; and details some lessons learned.

Traditional Indonesian Approaches to Decision Making and Dispute Resolution

Conflict management or resolution occurs in a specific historical and cultural context which shapes the roles disputants play, the presence of and practice of intermediaries, procedures followed to address and manage differences, and outcomes which are sought. Exploring the current development of new means to resolve complex environmental problem in Indonesia, and some of the opportunities and obstacles inherent in this initiative, can best be approached by examining traditional Indonesian assumptions and procedures for dispute resolution. This is because they illustrate how public decisions have been conceptualized and handled in the past, and provide a cultural baseline for the development of new procedures.

Indonesia has a number of traditional, or indigenous, as well as imported methods of decision-making and dispute resolution. In general, these procedures can be divided into administrative or judicial procedures in which a respected or officially sanctioned third party makes either an advisory or binding decision, and voluntary consensual processes in which parties develop mutually acceptable solutions to common problems through collaborative deliberatory procedures. The former procedures have roots both in the historical court processes of various kingdoms, sultanates, and local adapt or customary law leaders in villages, as well as in colonial Dutch administrative and court procedures that have been carried over since independence in 1949. The latter, consensually-based approaches have their roots in self-governing systems of deliberation and village justice found on most islands throughout the archipelago (Ihromi, 1988). This paper is primarily concerned with voluntary collaborative processes, whether practiced in adat proceedings or through one of a number of forms of community deliberative processes.

While consensual procedures for decision-making and dispute resolution vary widely across Indonesia, there are some commonalties found throughout the nation. First, many disputes historically have been handled by judicial procedures in which an authoritative decision-maker, such as an adat or customary law leader, facilitates a meeting between disputants and either assists them to negotiate their own agreement using customary standards and criteria and/or his advice as a framework for settlement, or makes either an advisory non-binding or binding decision. Second, many ethnic groups have had in the past, or continue to have, consensually-based deliberative procedures for handling a variety of issues that emerge in the process of living together in a community. Examples of these deliberative procedures include the runggun process of the Batak population of North Sumatra (Slats and Portier, 1992), the deliberations of Minangkabau of West Sumatra (Von Benda-Beckman, 1984), council of elders meetings of Javanese villages (Koentjaraningrat, 1989), discussion groups of the Bukat and Kereho in Kalimantan (Sellato, 1994), or clan procedures in Irian Jaya (Tjitradjaja, 1993). In Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, the term used to describe this form of decision-making is musyawarah. Musyawarah is a group deliberative process, whose goal is reaching muafakat, or consensus. Consensus is generally seen by Indonesians as a solution which all concerned parties find acceptable, and ideally which can be supported by all concerned parties with unanimous acclaim. Javanese describe this outcome as one in which "I am happy and you are happy." In general, musyawarah is initiated when a community of people within a clan, village, or organization need to make a decision about a significant issue or event, or one or more parties feels aggrieved and wants a problem to be publicly addressed and resolved. The process usually begins when a concerned party, aggrieved person or group, or community elder approaches a respected informal or formal leader, requests that he act as an intermediary, and that a dialogue process be initiated. It should be noted that the leader who has been approached may not be totally neutral in regard to his relationship with one or more of the parties, and frequently may be intimately connected and a member of their social network. He also may not be entirely impartial regarding the issues in question, but his acceptability is based upon the respect that the parties hold for him, the belief that he can conduct an effective process, and that he will be fair in his dealing with all parties.

At the beginning of the process, the leader will often play a go-between role to identify concerned parties, obtain their commitment to participate, and initiate the problem-solving process by setting a time and a place for the meeting. Problem solving may be conducted using several formats including: a) private individual meetings between the leader and concerned parties without the parties ever meeting face-to-face; b) individual meetings with a subsequent joint meeting; or c) exclusively in a joint meeting involving all primary parties. Joint meetings, on occasion, may also be attended by interested but not directly involved parties who are observers, advisors, settlement implementers, or community overseers or evaluators as to the fairness of the outcome.

If there is to be a joint meeting, and there frequently is, the session usually begins with relationship establishing or building activities - introductions, informal talk between participants (but not about the dispute), and common taking of refreshments. Often, the leader then review why the people are at the meeting, provides an overview of the activities to be pursued, and may outline the issues to be discussed. He may also outline the goal of reaching a muafakat and identify common interests or superordinate goals subscribed to by all the parties that any encourage agreement making.

The dialogue begins with one of the parties describing the problem. In more conservative and traditional communities, speaking may be sequenced according to rank, status, age or gender, while in other communities, younger or more vocal parties, regardless of the status or rank that they hold, may begin. The process of dialogue is often relatively unstructured with discussion generally moving freely from one issue to another, as participants explore and define the problem in more detail, ask each other questions, identify underlying interests or needs to be addressed, seek advice from respected elders, explore objective standards or criteria based upon adat law or other historical practice that might shape the agreement, and explore potential solutions to issues of concern. Generally, individual speakers have unlimited time to present their views and may structure their presentations in any way that they wish. However, an extremely long-winded speaker may be admonished by his leader or asked to finish stating his views in a timely manner. As some ethnic groups in Indonesia, such as Javanese and Sundanese, are often reluctant to deal directly with conflict and confront or debate people with whom they disagree, the dialogue may take an indirect form of "speaking to a question," rather than speaking directly to a specific individual with an opposed view. They may also ritually talk through solutions which have previously been arrived at through private meetings, thus publicly affirming agreements without engaging in direct confrontation. This approach maintains the face of all participants, preserves their individual sense of power, calm, and control of the situation, and helps to maintain smooth interpersonal relationships which are highly valued in the culture. Reportedly, other groups, such as those from Batak and Madura, seem to be more comfortable with open dialogue and debate, and are willing to engage in lively and vociferous discussion. Discussion may also follow a pattern of turn-taking where one individual at a time holds the floor, or polychronic dialogue with several people speaking at once, frequently overlapping statements, or multiple small side-group discussions happening concurrently with the major dialogue. In general, turn-taking appears to be more common when participants of different status or age are involved in the discussions, with high status participants accorded more respect and attention than those with lower status.

The emergence of consensus appears to occur in several ways. First, one of the participants may ultimately propose a solution to the problem that others popularly acclaim. Second, a number of participants may contribute components of a solution, which are gradually elaborated upon, integrated, and refined until everyone can agree to the final formulation. Third, participants may suggest several possible solutions that are compared and evaluated in a discussions, with one finally being recognized as the mutually preferable outcome. Often the leader will identify a tentative consensus, state it, and then encourage further discussion to determine if the parties could really accept it as a settlement option or to refine it into a final agreement. After further discussion, the leader may again test the agreement by restating it and asking for either approval or disapproval from the individuals in the group. Acclamation in generally indicated verbally or by head nodding or smiling.

The role of the leader throughout the discussion is to listen, show respect to the participants, recognize speakers, act as an informal referee, and, wen appropriate, to identify and test for potential group consensus. The degree to which the leader interjects his views as to the appropriateness or desirability of various options, or initiates specific settlement proposals, seems to differ depending upon who the leader is (status position, or formal authority), the group he is working with, the issue in question, his ethnic group or region or origin. Formal, high level leaders or government officials are often more directive, and are given greater leeway to interject their opinions and suggestions by meeting participants, that are informal or some traditional leaders. The ideal function of the leader of a musyawarah process, as identified by a number of former participants in the procedure from a range of ethnic groups across the country, is described as a person who is more impartial, limits their injection of opinions, and who recognizes the convergence of a group consensus.

The above approach to decision-making and dispute resolution is similar to consensus decision-making processes and roles played by third parties in a number of other cultures, and is also comparable in many ways to the mediation process used in western countries (Moore, 1986). Indonesian governmental agencies, NGO's and representatives from industry are currently exploring the design and implementation of voluntary process to resolve environmental disputes, and how traditional methods and procedures from outside of the country (Bingham, 1984) can be combined to better handle public and natural resource disputes.

Indonesian Environmental Dispute Resolution

Indonesians have long been concerned about the use of their natural resources and environmental issues. Customary or adat law in many locales details how land and water may be used as well as how social settlement and interactions should be conducted. The first specifically environmental laws and policies on a national level were promulgated by the Dutch during their colonial administration.

The development of an independent national policy on environmental management can be traced back to Indonesian participation in the 1972 Stockholm Conference (the United Nations Conference of the Human Environment), the result of which was the establishment of the National Committee on Environment. The committee formulated the National Development Plan, which ultimately resulted in a National Environmental Policy in 1973. The policy stipulated that, "In the implementation of development, Indonesia's natural resources should be rationally utilized. The exploitation of natural resources should not destroy the human environment and should be executed by a comprehensive policy which takes into account the needs of future generations."

In 1976 a new Ministry of Environment was created. To link the agency to the regions and local government, environmental advisory units or bureaus were established in each provincial government (BKLH's) under the authority of the Governor's office. The bureaus and newly created Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Commissions were mandated to coordinate activities affecting the environment of various departments (Department of Forestry, Department of Mining and Energy, Department of Industry, Department of Public Health, Department of Public Works, the Coordinating Agency for Capital Investment (BKPM), and the Department of Internal Affairs) in the provinces. The Environmental Bureaus, while having no operational functions, have acted as coordinating bodies of local government units and sectoral departments.

In 1982, the Central Parliament passed the Environmental Management Act (EMA) which established: 1) the right of every person to a good and healthy living environment, along with the obligation of every person to maintain and protect the environment; 2) the principle of the polluter pays; 3) the requirement for analysis of environmental impact of every factory or business which is considered likely to have significant impact on the environment, carried out according to governmental regulations; 4) the authority to establish licensing systems in the service of environmental management and protection (the obligation to incorporate the environmental conditions in the license of activities); 5) the right of every person to participate in the environmental management process; and 6) compensation of victims of environmental damage and/or pollution, and restoration of the living environment. Article 6 of the EMA provides for an analysis of environmental impact for "every plan that is considered likely to have a significant impact on the environment." The government regulation which outlined the Environmental Impact Analysis (AMDAL) process was finally approved in 1986.

The period of 1988-1994 (The Fifth Five Year Development Plan) resulted in a number of laws and regulations resulted to environmental management including an act regarding Natural Resources Management including an act regarding Natural Resources Management and the Ecosystem, regulations concerning Water Pollution Control, and a Presidential Decree establishing an Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL). In a addition, President Suharto indicated that sanctions would be used against violators, and a joint Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Minister of the Environment, Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and Head of the National Police to strengthen their cooperation in environmental law enforcement.

Difficulties in Command and Control Enforcement and Moves Toward Voluntary Compliance

In spite of progress in developing new environmental agencies, laws, policies, and regulations, the government increasingly encountered a number of difficulties in enforcing new laws. First, regulatory agencies were weak, did not have strong or elaborate mandates, lacked enforcement mechanisms, and had limited staff and resources. Second, many large industries believed that they could avoid compliance and sanctions because agencies would not stand up to them and courts could be manipulated to achieve a favorable outcome. Third, there was a general lack of understanding of environmental laws and regulations on the part of industries, governmental agencies, and the public at large. Many governmental officials believed that enforcement actions with fines for violators were inappropriate, and more educational and problem-solving procedures should be used to address environmental problems. Fourth, many companies argued that non-compliance was based on lack of resources to install required equipment, and that what was needed were mechanisms to assist industries to obtain additional resources, and implement pollution prevention, abatement and mitigation plans. Fifth, enforcement actions, especially those that had to go through the courts, were long, cumbersome, and often took years to achieve compliance or provide affected parties with relief. Sixth, adversarial enforcement procedures often engendered additional resistance on the part of companies, made their officers lose face, and drew out the process of achieving compliance. Seventh, there was a general distrust of the effectiveness, impartiality and potential corruptibility of courts and judges, on the part of many citizens and environmental NGO's. These groups frequently did not believe that a fair and impartial decision on environmental cases could emerge from the judiciary. Finally, there was a growing belief among many parties that face-to-face negotiations might be a more effective means of addressing and resolving environmental problems. It was believed that negotiations, especially mediated negotiations, would provide affected parties with opportunities to convey their concerns to government officers and industries; conduct a genuine problem-solving dialogue (which currently is rare in Indonesia); and craft comprehensive settlements that would cover compensation, pollution control, and public participation in monitoring and implementation which were not possible to achieve through a judicial decision.

In 1993, the new Environment Minister, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, mandated the Ministry and the Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) to begin using mixed policy tools combining both command and control enforcement mechanism with voluntary compliance procedures. It was felt that this mix would be more effective in achieving the goals of the agency and in achieving compliance. One of the compliance tools initiated was mediation. Mediation is the intervention of an acceptable third party into a dispute or negotiation to assist concerned parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to issues in question. The agencies selected mediation because it was seen as being culturally compatible with traditional ways of making decisions, because key governmental and NGO leaders knew of its effectiveness in resolving similar disputes in other countries, and because it appeared to be a means of addressing some of the problems with command and control mechanisms described above. While the name of the process that was to be implemented, "mediation," was a foreign term, the conceptualization of the process, the role of the mediator, and procedures used have been significantly influenced by the Indonesian practice of musyawarah.

The initiative to introduce mediation, both at the national and provincial levels, currently has four components: * BAPEDAL's initiation, on a trial basis, of mediation to resolve a number of prototypical environmental disputes, most notably water pollution cases; * The Ministry of Environment's sponsorship, in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellaschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), a German technical assistance agency, of a number of Executive Seminars on Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) to develop understanding and support among key decision makers for the use of the process, and several intensive skill and procedure-based workshops on Environmental Mediation to build a cadre of skilled intermediates; * The Ministry of Environment's appointment of a committee to draft regulations and procedures that will integrate environmental mediation into the operations of that agency and BAPEDAL; and * The Ministry of the Environment and the Governor's Office in Kalimantan in pursuit of discussions and workshops on dispute systems design to explore the institutionalization of mediation within existing agencies, or the development of new independent service providers.

Experience to Date with Mediation

Since the late 1980's several environmental disputes, most involving industrial pollution, have been referred to mediation. These include the Tapak River case in Semarang, Central Java, the Sambong River case in Pekalongan, Central Java, the Siak River case in the northern part of Sumatra, and the Tembok Dukuh (electroplating pollution case) in Surabaya, East Java. All of these cases have involved affected parties, central and local government, and industries. Two cases, the Topak and Sambong, reached agreements in which compensation was paid to the affected parties and steps were taken to control pollution. The Siak River case, which involved people who lived near or along the river and a pulp and paper industry, has resulted in an agreement in principle in which the industry will provide funds (called a "social contribution" rather than compensation), to the local people to restore their economy. The local people, with the assistance of an environmental NGO, are currently in the process of conducting a needs assessment of the their economy to determine how the funds will be spent. However, the initial agreement on how the pollution will be controlled has not been implemented, and the deadline stipulated in the initial agreement has passed. One reason for the lack of follow-up action in this case was the failure to involve the local government, which is the agency that has responsibility for preventing and controlling pollution in the province, in the process. This omission led to a lower commitment on that agency's part to monitor led to a lower commitment on that agency's part to monitor and enforce the agreement. Another factor for delayed implementation has been limited incentives or enforcement that would encourage the industry to comply with the agreement.

In the final case, the Tembok Dukuh, the parties failed to reach an agreement and it has moved on to litigation. It is currently before the Indonesian Supreme Court.

The mediation process used to handle the above cases, has in many ways been a blend of both traditional and external intermediary models. Third parties have been either authoritative decision-makers from concerned agencies or independent third parties, who have either been appointed by the government or selected by the parties. In most cases, the intermediaries have had either a prior formal or informal connection to the parties and often have not been perceived to be totally neutral toward one or more parties or impartial regarding the issues in question. In most of the cases the mediators were government officials who had a substantive interests in the outcomes of the disputes. Session formats have included both private and joint sessions with the parties, and intermediaries have performed both substantive and process advisory roles depending upon their status and defined roles, and the issues involved. In general, intermediaries have had no formal role in the implementation or monitoring of agreements.

Dynamics and Issues in Implementing and Institutionalizing Mediation and Lessons Learned

In the process of conducting the pilot mediations and exploring the institutionalization of the process, a number of cultural and structural issues have emerged that the Ministry, BAPEDAL, NGO's, and industry will have to address for the procedure to be more effective in the future. These issues include: unfamiliarity of potential parties with a formal and structured mediation process as a means to resolve disputes, and failure to recognize the similarity between this process and that of mysyawarah; cultural traditions of authoritative and bureaucratic decision-making; dynamics and problems involved in making collaborative decisions between people and groups of different rank and status; the selection of the intermediary, his impartiality and incorruptibility; lack of incentives in the part of industry to implement agreements; and failure of governmental agencies to conduct consistent monitoring and inspection work to assure compliance with agreements and regulations.

Although most Indonesians are familiar with musyawarah, they do not immediately see its similarities to the mediation process, or see its applicability for resolving environmental disputes. This is in part due to efforts on the part of the government, since the time of independence, to discredit downplay and shift the resolution of disputes from village-based deliberative and collaborative dispute resolution systems to either administrative decisions by governmental bureaucrats or formal judicial decisions by judges; and in part by governmental efforts to define environmental mediation as something totally new and different from traditional processes Although musyawarah is part of Pancasila, or the five principles that is the ruling ideology of the state, it is only recently that governmental decision-makers and other concerned parties in several sectors are beginning to explore its broader applicability to environmental disputes, and similarity to the mediation process. It is expected that an ongoing series of educational seminars on mediation and its relationship to musyawarah will identify some of the similarities and encourage its use in multiple sectors.

Another aspect of parties' understanding of the mediation process is confusion regarding its goal. Some parties, especially those from industry and government agencies, have viewed participation in mediation as an end in itself, regardless of outcome. In this respect it has been seen as a form of public participation that provides an opportunity for input, but not as a means of direct decision-making. This perception has led some participants to promote the process as a way of procedurally appeasing angry people, but not solving problems. A more in-depth understanding of the goal of the process needs to be presented so that it will not be used in a manipulative way.

A second set of dynamics affecting the implementation of mediation are cultural views and traditions toward authority and authoritative decision-making. Indonesia has a long history of collaborative decision-making, especially a the village level. It also has strong traditions of unilateral command decision-making by its rulers, and deference and dependence by the "little people" on governmental decision makers who are seen as "fathers," and to whom loyalty and obedience is owed (Mulder, 1992). These cultural patterns have impacts both on leaders and citizens who may potentially be involved in mediations. Leaders, especially government officials, generally see themselves as authoritative decision-makers and not facilitators of collaborative process and consensual agreements. Citizens as potential disputants, be they from NGO's or industry, often defer to the suggestions or will of a governmental decision maker, both out of respect and for fear of angering a representative of the all-powerful state. These patterns make collaborative decision-making more difficult.

Another dynamic is that collaborative deliberative processes in Indonesia, such as muysawaradh, historically have been practiced among people of similar rank and status, in which peers, rather than people of different rank, deliberate on questions of common concern and then make decisions. A significant number of Indonesian ethnic groups are highly stratified and superior/subordinate relationships are elaborately proscribed as to appropriate language, deference, and behavior. Musyawarah, which involves people of different rank and status, appears historically to be a process of hierarchical consensus-building is which groups deliberate on questions. They take their conclusions via delegate or petitioner to the net highest level groups for additional highest levels of the village, organization, or society. This blend of egalitarian collaborative problem-solving among peers, and hierarchical consensus-building, while providing a cultural basis for cooperative problem-solving, does pose obstacles for direct problem solving by groups with members of different rank and status, and some governmental involvement in decision-making, old patterns are still very strong. Many members of society still assume that the leaders' role is to direct and decide, citizens are to obey, and rights of common people are often not considered to be on par with those in positions of higher authority. This leads to a dynamic in which leaders are reluctant to give citizens equal standing in deliberatory process because of their subordinate position. Citizens are reticent to voice their views in front of superiors-out of respect of their rank, because of significant differences in power, or fear of potential retribution-and exhibit deferential behavior which masks their true concerns or interests and limits their participation in the process.

The selection of the intermediary, his relationship to the parties, and his position toward issues in question are very important factors, both for the diputants and the intermediary. Whether the intermediary is the leader of a musyawarah process or a mediator, the decision as to who should perform this role may be a critical factor in determining the outcome. There are a variety of models of intermediaries and their relationship to parties in dispute, including, but not limited to: the "mediator of confidence," who is intimately related to the parties and is part of their social network; the authority and owner to shape for impose a decision; or the impartial process mediator, who has neither formal authoritative power nor directs involved parties toward any specific substantive outcome. These three models each imply a position that the mediator may take toward both the parties and the issues and business communities that a mediator who is perceived to be partial, either because of his prior relationship to one or more parties or who has a personal or institutional agenda (such as may be the case with a mediator from a governmental agency which has a specific substantive interest and mandate to enforce), may be looked upon with great suspicion or skepticism by potential parties. One of the critical issues in the future implementation of mediation in Indonesia will be balancing the selection of a mediator who is impartial enough to have credibility with the musyawarah process from relational networks or governmental officials, who may be interested parties. For the process to have credibility, parties must either be able to select a mediator whom they all can trust, with the government mediator will have to play a more disinterested third party role than has previously been the case. Clearly, there are instances where a government agency such as BAPEDAL, or perhaps a Governor's Office, can play this more impartial role, but in other cases a neutral and impartial mediator may be required.

Mediation, like command and control approaches to enforcement used by the Ministry and BAPEDAL, has encountered similar problems in implementation and compliance. In spite of the fact that the parties have agreed to settlements, major portions of agreements either have nor bee implemented or have been ignored by the involved company. Industry representatives often continue to believe that agreements will not be enforced and that they can get around violations and possible consequences. It is clear that mediation will never be completely successful until such time as industry either sees reasons to voluntarily comply, or perceives significant risk or potential negative consequences for non-compliance. This will clearly depend on the ability of the government to develop command and control mechanisms, to enforce sanctions when necessary, and to create a higher probability of costs if voluntary agreements are not adhered to.

Lack of post-agreement monitoring and inspection on the part of the government have also contributed to non-compliance with both control and command, and mediated agreements. Whether because of lack of resources or personnel, nuclear authority or mandates, a belief that verbal and written agreements are self-executing and the same as implemented settlements, reluctance to confront industries that continue to pollute, or claims of financial pay-offs, the government has frequently failed to enforce mediated agreements. This failure has led some companies to believe that there are no consequences for non-compliance, and NGO's to question the viability of mediated settlements. If mediation is to have credibility it has to be effective in achieving compliance. This has led some parties to encourage the involvement of the mediator throughout implementation, such as might occur in the mysyawarah process, so that there is a forum, a procedure, and a respected individual who can provide oversight to assure implementation. This approach uses a combination of frequent meetings in which progress must be demonstrated, oversight by a respected person (the mediator), and potential public embarrassment if agreements are not followed through, to promote compliance.


In conclusion, Indonesia has a long tradition of voluntary deliberative and dispute resolution procedures that have some significant similarities to mediation processes developed in other countries and cultures. However, cultural patterns regarding who is appropriate as an intermediary and the role that he plays, views toward direct confrontation and problem-solving, traditional expectations for relationships between people of different rank and status, and views toward compliance and implementation of agreements, will strongly influence how mediation will be practiced in Indonesia. It is clear that mediation will continue to develop as a part of the compliance and enforcement programs of Indonesian governmental agencies, and will also be used as a forum for pubic participation in the planning stage (spatial planning EIA, licensing, and regulatory negotiations), of development activities, and to achieve compliance with environmental regulations. However, in implementing mediation, the government and other parties will have to address a number of critical cultural and structural issues described above, to assure that the process is used to achieve fair decisions and compliance and not used as a means to coopt affected people. It is also clear that the development of effective law enforcement, both administrative and criminal, and the development of a strong, independent, and incorruptible judiciary will significantly influence the viability and effectiveness of mediation and other collaborative, deliberative processes.

Article copyright Cultural Survival, Inc.

CSQ Disclaimer

Our website houses close to five decades of content and publishing. Any content older than 10 years is archival and Cultural Survival does not necessarily agree with the content and word choice today.

CSQ Issue: