On August 2, 2002, the Turkish parliament passed a reform bill that introduced a number of remarkable changes in the letter of the nation’s law. The bill reversed several longstanding policies: the death penalty was abolished in peacetime, non-Muslim religious groups were given the right to purchase property, and Kurdish language private schools, television and radio broadcasts were legalized.
On the surface the new laws constitute a profound shift in the government’s position on the cultural rights of the country’s largest minority, the 12 million indigenous Kurds. A mere decade ago, the simple act of speaking in Kurdish could expose one to criminal charges of being a “separatist”, and as recently as June four musicians were handed three to nine year prison sentences by the National Security Court for singing in Kurdish at a wedding reception.
The reforms have been hailed by many Kurds and human rights advocates as a major step towards greater recognition of the Kurds’ cultural rights and more equitable treatment for a ethnic group that has long faced institutionalized discrimination in the Muslim world’s only ‘secular democracy’. Entrepreneurs are applying in droves for permission to set up private schools for Kurdish language instruction, and Kurdish radio and television broadcasts are now legal on privately owned stations.
Yet Turkey still does not officially recognize the Kurds or any other ethnic group as minorities. And critics can still point to a host of contradictions in government regulation of rights relating to cultural expression. Article Three of the constitution – “The language of the country is Turkish and there can be no changes made to this article” – is just one example of the many laws on the books that threaten to trump, and perhaps eviscerate, the new legislation.
For these and many other reasons, the reforms have elicited a mix of cautious hope and heavy skepticism from Kurds in Turkey and abroad. Despite the sweeping scope of the reforms, some aspects of the status quo show little signs of changing. Students from several universities who petitioned to have classes taught in Kurdish before the reforms were passed have been jailed, and some still await trial.
Lending the greatest weight to the arguments of those who claim the reforms are merely window-dressing is the fact that the cases of most Kurdish prisoners of conscience do not fall within the scope of the new wave of benevolence. A new provision opens up Turkish court verdicts to review by the European Court of Human Rights, but it is not retroactive. This legal nicety effectively seals the 15-year sentences of the four Kurdish parliamentarians jailed since 1994 under “anti-terror” laws, as alleged members of an illegal armed rebel group. In 2001 the European Court ruled that they had not received a fair trial, but Turkey has taken no action in response to calls for a retrial.
Many Kurds worry that the same security laws that enable the government to shut down pro-Kurdish newspapers and radio stations will severely limit the effectiveness of the new reforms. What is needed instead, they say, is a fundamental change in Turkish attitudes towards the Kurdish minority. These critics contend the measure will do little to improve the lives of Kurds, as it does not alter the public school system, does not allow the use of Kurdish as a teaching medium, and leaves private institutions vulnerable to arbitrary crackdowns under the perilously broad “anti-terror” legislation. Kani Xulam, director of the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), has said the reforms are “very very very wanting”, and characterizes them as “reluctant steps to offer some lukewarm acceptance to the Kurds”.
Despite the legislation’s shortcomings, and Turkey’s checkered record on implementing past reforms, the bill has led to progress that few would have expected just a few short months ago. Twenty-eight children indicted on charges of “aiding a separatist movement” by shouting slogans at a rally for Kurdish language education were recently acquitted. Members of the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), the lone pro-Kurdish group fielding candidates in upcoming elections, have welcomed the new laws as “truly a revolution”. And in September Education Minister Necdet Tekin announced the completion of new regulations intended to pave the way for the opening of Kurdish language schools.
The European Union has balked at setting a firm date for negotiations on Turkey’s membership to commence, citing continuing human rights abuses such as torture, and heavy restrictions which remain in place on freedom of expression and association. But Leyla Zana, the most prominent of the four jailed parliamentarians and recipient of the European Parliament’s human rights award in 1995, has called on the EU to set a date for negotiations at its summit in December. In an August 29 letter to senior EU officials, she praised the reforms as “historical”, and noted that undue delay in the application process could make it “impossible to put into practice the recent legal arrangements and to speed up the pace of democratization.” Having served slightly more than half of her 15-year sentence, and perhaps more entitled to a cynical view of Turkey’s actions than most, Zana saw fit to hail the reforms as an affirmation of the “brotherhood between Turks and Kurds”. On this view, the reforms might be a cause for measured optimism, a qualified victory in the Kurds’ long and ongoing struggle for recognition from their Turkish neighbors of their rich cultural identity, and indeed their very existence as Kurds.
